PERCEPTIONS ON SECURITY CULTURE

Ruxandra BULUC*, Ciprian LUNGU**, Ioan DEAC*

*Strategic, Public and Intercultural Communication Department, 'Carol I' National Defence University, Romania,
**ProSCOP Association, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract: Security culture encompasses the socially-transmitted traditions, mindsets, action modes which are specific to a certain community found in a certain geographical area. Security culture serves a vital function in its capacity of social cohesion mechanism as it provides the necessary framework for a social representation of security and it fosters the development of certain behavioral models, patterns and attitudes with respect to security. These, in turn, ensure the state of security that a society needs in order to be stable and well-defined. The present article presents the perceptions that the informed Romanian public has on security culture, its meaning, components, development, promotion, etc. The analysis is based on the results of a questionnaire administered in November-December 2017 to a group of 152 respondents and places the answers in the more global context of the trends in security culture.

Keywords: security culture; promotion; vulnerabilities; risks; threats

1. INTRODUCTION

The interest in security is increasingly developed in contemporary society. It concerns broader categories of public and various professional groups. These pursuits and interests have generated practices and approaches that are more or less similar, but which definitely foster adjustment and adaptation mechanisms for the social and public realities regarding security. A certain structuring and interconnectedness can be noticed in their respect which point to the fact that a specific security culture is present and manifest.

The aim of the present article is to provide a clearer understanding of what security culture is at present by taking a brief look at its evolution. Once the theoretical basis has been established, it is important to understand the means through which security culture can be promoted and what functions these different types of communication can achieve. The third part of the research focuses on the results of a questionnaire regarding security culture promotion.

2. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE SECURITY CULTURE

Security culture is the result of social interactions that take place among groups, organizations and communities concerned with aspects of social security, of certain learning and knowledge development processes which mirror the human needs for protection, safety and shelter. Security culture is adaptive, it develops in relation to societal evolution and is transmitted from one generation to the next through various means of communication, either written or oral, as well as through support practices for security values.

2.1 Academic perspectives on security culture. A precursor to the concept of security culture was the term 'strategic culture', first developed by J.Snyder (1977) with respect to the Soviet approach to strategic thinking and defined as

> the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired with regard to [nuclear strategy] (Snyder, 1977:8).

During the Cold War, strategic culture reflected the confrontational situation and the positioning of the two military and political blocks: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, separated by the Iron Curtain. In fact, each military block was closed onto itself, looking with hostility, fear and mistrust over that 'curtain'. At the same time, neither side wanted a direct confrontation. Confrontation avoidance was most likely due to the nuclear arsenal each side had at its disposal.

Continental missiles allowed them to hit targets in the adversary's strategic locations, without any direct confrontation. Strategic culture came as a response to this situation and it offered doctrines, principles and coping mechanisms for military and political approaches to the situation created. If the First World War had been one in which belligerents had got stuck in trenches dug close together, during the Cold War, the opposing forces took cover behind the strategic blockade they had created and their general beliefs, attitudes and behaviors reflected these strategic positions which dictated their interactions with one another, the way they positioned themselves with respect to whom they perceived as the enemy. Since these positions remained fixed for nearly half a century, they became engrained in the culture of the respective states and surpassed the transitory status of policies. However, at that time, strategic culture focused mainly outwardly, towards enemies and allies as borders and delimitations were distinct, and roles had been clearly assigned and were distinctive. Strategic culture was at that time derivative of and dictated ways of interaction in the international arena which focused little on attitudes towards security at home.

C.S. Gray takes the concept one step further. Strategic culture is

> the master narrative, is the disarmingly elementary, even commonsensical, idea, that a security community is likely to think and behave in ways that are influenced by what it has taught itself about itself and its relevant contexts. And that education, to repeat, rests primarily upon the interpretation of history and history's geography (or should it be geography's history?) (Gray, 2006:7).

Gray focuses not only on international strategies but also on what strategic culture means for the society that upholds it. He stresses the importance of what a particular security community thinks of itself, what it is taught about itself, what contexts it operates in, and what its geography and history can be interpreted as.

We can notice a shift from the limited perspective of strategic culture, to the more encompassing security culture of today. This shift is due to increasingly complex geopolitical and geostrategic interactions, to the more amorphous, ambiguous and unpredictable nature of security challenges, to demographic changes etc. Gray maintains the term strategic culture but refines its meaning to include three concepts: (1) public culture; (2) strategic culture; and (3) military (organizational) culture (Gray, 2006:10). He also

emphasizes the strong bond of mutual determination that binds culture and identity,

> We must insist that culture in its several identities – public, strategic, military-organizational – should consist of assumptions and ideas that are strongly held (Gray, 2006:11).

Culture is the lens through which people perceive the world, the software that we are programmed into without being aware, by being members of a certain society.

> [Culture] enables us to make sense of our world. Culture provides us with the assumptions, largely unspoken and unwritten, that are the foundation for, though not the sole determinants of, our judgments. Culture yields us the truths, small and large, that we know should guide our decisions and actions (Gray, 2006:12).

We cannot make conscious choices with respect to the culture we belong to, as Gray explains, 'societies, security communities, do not choose their strategic cultures. Rather do their strategic cultures choose them' (Gray, 2006:17) and this dictates that ways in which we respond to the events we are confronted with, the ways we interpret them, the ways in which we react, predict, fall prey to security challenges.

Although not entirely impervious to change, security culture modifies only when there are strong enough reasons to do so, when adjustments are called for, when society itself is altered fundamentally. We have noticed such changes in recent years and they have impacted security culture as it will be reflected in the result of our survey. To name just a few of these changes: an open border policy entails migration of workforce and not only; IT developments lead to vulnerability from cyberattacks, ideological conflicts cause terrorist attacks; low intensity conflicts can escalate and lead to large scale migrations, etc.

Our survey and resulting analysis uncovered what elements of security culture are seen as most prominent, what risks, threats and vulnerabilities are strongly felt by the public and what the public perceives as being the most important aspects that security culture promotion should focus on so as to become an intrinsic part of a well-functioning society that can meet contemporary challenges.

2.2 Institutional approach to security culture. In the *National Defense Strategy 2015-2019: A Strong Romania within Europe and the World*, in the chapter 'The educational, healthcare,

social and demographic dimension', one of the lines of action mentioned is 'the fostering the security culture, including through continuous education, aimed at promoting values, norms, attitudes or actions allowing for the assimilation of the national security concept'.

To complete this provision, *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy*, drafted by the Presidential Administration and approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence decision no.128 on 10th December 2015, defines security culture as

> the sum total of values, norms, attitudes or actions which determine the understanding and assimilation at a societal level of the concept of security and its derivatives (national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy etc.).

The above-mentioned definitions highlight several angles from which security culture can be presented and analyzed and various approaches to this concept become evident: the cognitive approach related to the knowledge obtained directly or acquired as part of the educational process in the field of security, interpretations of the concept of security; the emotional approach referring to perceptions, affective availabilities, feelings that determine individual and group attitudes; the evaluative approach pertaining to assessments with respect to the level and quality of security; the historical approach focused on experience, processes, evolutions, traditions, customs, practices; the operational approach related to actional patterns, favorite modes of action, stipulated procedures.

In society, security culture has several important functions. Firstly, it defines group, community, society identity and ensures a foundation for social solidarity, a rallying point made up of common objectives that inspire devotion, loyalty, cohesion, belonging and patriotism. Moreover, security culture ensures the reference points needed for the projection of the social structure of security and for the development of specific capabilities, it defines the patterns, behaviors and attitudes in the field of security.

By including security culture under the larger umbrella term of culture, one might also make reference to the cultural patrimony, defined as 'a testament and expression of the values, beliefs and traditions that have resulted in time from the interaction of human and natural factors;, according to the Ministry of Culture and National Identity. Thus, by way of analogy, we could speak of the security culture patrimony which includes the immovable material patrimony (special strategic and operational infrastructures, critical infrastructures, administrative infrastructures) and movable material patrimony (artistic treasury, technical treasury, craftsmanship treasury, etc.) and the immaterial patrimony (beliefs, values, norms, rituals, symbols, attitudes, practices, forms of verbal expression, etc.).

3. PROMOTING SECURITY CULTURE

The promotion of security culture includes an array of public and strategic communication activities, influence communication and various exhibitions and promotional events whose purpose is to inform, stimulate interest, educate, as well as change target groups' (be they individuals of institutions) attitudes and behaviors with respect to security issues.

Public and strategic communication presupposes the existence of an information (message) exchange between public actors by means of specific channels and processes. In the promotion of security culture, the actors can be individual or collective entities with responsibilities in this field, who plan, initiate and support formal communication processes (which function hierarchically, legally, etc.) or entities with concerns in this field which participate and support formal actors through informal actions and activities, establishing autonomous social support networks. Strategic communication can focus, among others, on existing security issues and on the identification of alternative responses, on the creation of a positive image for the institutions with responsibilities in the field of security, and on trust building to support these institutions' actions. Raising public awareness can be achieved, for example, by transmitting information and knowledge regarding the enforcement of specific norms, rules or procedures which contribute to security culture development. Security culture messages have specific, distinct, concrete objectives, designed to ensure the success of promotion, to be well structured with a view to transmitting ideas which can draw the target audience's attention.

Influence communication presupposes the transmission of intentional informative content, meant to alter, transform target audiences' opinions, attitudes and behaviors. The process of influence targeted in the promotion of security culture is educational and is achieved by awareness raising activities, conferences, seminars and

debates by editing special publications, creating and broadcasting media products, etc. All these are meant to facilitate the transmission and consolidation of knowledge and attitudes among social actors (institutions and organizations in the field of security), media institutions and the general public. By broadcasting objective, timely and correct information, influence communication contributes to the development of resilience by countering and neutralizing the consequences of negative information, including by creating a desirable image for security culture and the institutions that promote it.

Structures responsible for this type of communication are found at the central level of the Ministry of National Defence - the Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the Information and Public Relations Directorate, as well as at the level of structures that make up these ministries: the information and Public Relations Offices of the General Staffs of the Armed Forces branches; the Romanian Police - The Information and Public Relations Center, the Romanian Gendarmerie - the Information and Public Relations Service, the Romanian General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations - the Information and Public Relations Service.

Promotional events, as a form of unidirectional communication, can contribute to informing and raising public awareness regarding security issues. Even if this type of activities target a relatively small audience, by broadcasting them through means of mass communication, the number of receptors can become larger than initially estimated. Promotion activities focus on new concepts, visions, strategic publications and establishing institutional or personal contacts in the security field by participating in exhibitions, international conferences, fairs, etc.

4. MEASURING PERCEPTIONS ON SECURITY CULTURE AND ITS PROMOTION

This research presents the perceptions on security culture and its promotion that are held by an informed audience, with a view to identifying the main interests, representations, concerns and possible avenues for improvement that the participants in the survey believe to be relevant with respect to security culture. Security culture and its promotion are analyzed from several perspectives. Thus, the ways, methods, means of support and development for security culture of stimulating the public interest in this field as well

as alternative means of dissemination of specific ideas, notions, knowledge.

To offer a comprehensive view of the analyzed issue, the objective and available data provided by institutions which operate in the field of security have been supplemented by a subjective dimension regarding people's perceptions, attitudes and experiences with respect to security culture.

4.1 Data collection. The analysis is based on the results of a survey that was carried out in November-December 2017 meant to identify the perceptions regarding the promotion of security culture. The survey was based on a 23-item questionnaire, with multiple choice and open-ended answers. The questionnaire was accessible as a google form, it was transmitted via e-mail and distributed in printed form. The respondents had the possibility to add their personal answers for each question. The respondents are people interested in the field of security and security culture, who are students, researchers, employees or previously employed in this field.

The total number of persons who responded was 152, the vast majority of whom are young and very young: 81.5% under the age of 35. There were 8.6% respondents aged 45-60 and 1.3% over 60. 64.5% of the participants in the questionnaire were students (undergraduate, graduate, PhD or post-doctoral) and 22.3% were employed either in private or state institutions. As far as place of residence is concerned, the vast majority live in urban settings, over half of the respondents in Bucharest. Synthesizing the above-mentioned data, the profile of the respondents emerges: young and very young persons, under the age of 35, mostly students who live in the urban environment and have an interest in the security field.

4.2 Analysis of survey results. Two types of indicators have been used to perform the analysis presented in this research:
- objective indicators - observable, quantifiable by a third party, based on periodic reports and public data published by various institutions. These indicators have been used in data interpretation in order to verify and support the interpretations of the data resulted from the collection of questionnaire results and to integrate these interpretations in the larger context of the dynamics of the security environment and perceptions of security culture at a national and international level.
- perception indicators - which focus on the public's perceptions, attitudes and experiences,

quantifiable only by means of questionnaires. In order to verify the data resulted from the ProSCOP questionnaire, results obtained from surveys conducted by both Romanian and foreign specialized institutions have been employed.

4.3 Security culture outline. When asked what they consider to be the defining elements of security culture, more than half of the respondents define security culture by means of the cognitive approach (specialized knowledge needed for the understanding and internalizing the concept of security - 52%) and by means of the large scale operational approach (standard operating procedures for threats, risks and vulnerabilities). A significant percentage of participants (50%) add the historical approach with its immaterial patrimony component (a coherent set of ideas, values, ideals and symbols related to security) followed closely (47.7%) by the small scale operational approach (norms, regulations, specific rules pertaining to security issues). Less emphasis is placed on individual, group or societal lifestyles adapted to security conditions (22.4%) and on individual and societal behaviors with respect to security (28.9%), which indicates that respondents do not perceive security culture as the product of individual choices or of collective individual decisions, but rather as something that either transcends the individual or is the responsibility of the state. Moreover, the historical approach gathered the fewest responses as only 9.2% believed that security culture is the repository of experiences, beliefs, conceptions, attitudes, and customs regarding security. This type of shortsightedness could impact the cultural aspect of security, as a shared history is an important element of security culture and strongly determines societal attitudes towards security.

To synthesize, the respondents understand that security culture is a complex mechanism based not solely on knowledge regarding possible threats, risks and vulnerabilities but also on certain modes of action to tackle these challenges and that all these are rooted (as Gray explained) in a shared culture which comprises values, ideas, beliefs regarding what security is for that community. More precisely, security culture is being able to react efficiently when confronted with risks, threats, vulnerabilities based on and resorting to the core elements that bind the community together.

4.4 Objectives of security culture promotion. When asked what they believed should be the main objectives of security culture promotion, more than

two thirds of the respondents (69.7%) indicate citizens' awareness regarding security risks, threats and vulnerabilities as the main objective of security culture promotion. This is followed closely by objectives focused on ensuring minimum knowledge about security for as large an audience as possible (62.5%) and developing citizens' ability to understand risks, challenges and threats to security (58.6%). These answers closely reflect the answers to the previous question regarding the most defining elements of security culture.

Approximately one third of respondents consider that security culture promotion should lead to citizens' compliance with security norms, regulations, standard operating procedures (35.5%) or to adapt individual, group or societal behaviors to security-specific conditions (30.9%). This last choice further confirms the assessment formulated in 4.3, namely that security and security culture are not seen as the responsibility of the individual.

4.5 Promoting security domains. When asked which vertical component of security they would believe should be promoted above all, human security was the answer of the vast majority of respondents (81.6%), followed by national security (73.7%). At the opposite end of the spectrum, a low or moderate interest is manifested with respect to subregional security (13.2%), regional security (17.8%), euro-atlantic security (22.4%) and global security (44.1%). The paramount importance assigned to human security is a direct consequence of the fact that individualism is gaining ground as the dominant ideology of the 21st century. More precisely, individual interests are foregrounded, sometimes to the detriment of collective ones. According to *Future State 2030: The global megatrends shaping governments,* 'Advances in global education and technology have helped empower individuals like never before, leading to increased demands for transparency and participation in government and public decision-making.' In the case of Romania, the focus on human security can be correlated with limited trust in the government (24%) and in the Parliament (20%), according to a CURS survey.

The focus on national security can be associated with the trust that the Romanian public exhibits for the institutions that operate in the field of security and defence, more precisely in the Armed Forces, 71%, surpassed solely by the level of trust associated with firefighters 83%, according to the same CURS survey.

Moreover, disinformation campaigns combined with the lack of information campaigns have led to

a decrease in trust in the structures that manage security at a European and euro-atlantic level. According to a survey conducted by Gallup in south-eastern Europe in 2016, only 50% of Romanians associate NATO with country protection, while 8% consider NATO a threat to Romania's security and 25% have no opinion. With respect to EU membership, another Gallup survey from 2016 reveals the fact that 58% of Romanians believe that this status is beneficial for Romania, 17% that it is a disservice and the rest did not respond. These results are confirmed by a survey carried out by IRES in 2017 *Account of the political year 2017. Perspectives for 2018* according to which, the question 'How much do you trust the European Union?' received the following answers: 13% of the participants - very much, 38% - much, 31% - somewhat, 17% - little or not at all. In all cases, Romanians' attitude with respect to superstatal organizations with implications at the level of national security and responsibilities for subregional, regional and global security is divided.

4.6 Security threats to consider. Threats to national security represent 'actions, deeds of states, capacities, strategies, intentions or plans that can affect the security-related values, interests and national objectives and/or are able to endanger directly or indirectly national security, by affecting the normal functioning of state institutions, the citizens' lives and physical integrity and the organization of human communities', according to *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy.* Threats can be direct, objective, quantifiable, open or can be seen as such against a backdrop of uncertainty and lack of confidence. When asked which threats they consider a priority for security culture promotion two thirds of the respondents' answers focus on cyberattacks launched by hostile state and non-state entities (69.1%) and terrorism respectively (67.8%), while 32.3% feel threatened by hostile information actions.

Disinformation can be achieved by means of cyberattacks materialized in attempts to take over systems control of communications management, of financial management, of institutions, of stock market transactions, etc.

Terrorism is a major concern for the Romanian public because 142 failed, countered or finalized terrorist attacks were registered in Europe in 2016 and 1002 people were arrested for terrorism-related crimes. According to *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017* drafted by Europol, in Romania only one person was arrested

in 2016 for terrorist activities connected to jihadism, therefore, concrete threats against Romania are not as substantial as in the case of other European nations. Even under these circumstances, terrorism remains a threat that worries respondents mainly because of the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the phenomenon.

42.1% of respondents are concerned by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and trafficking of double-use products, 28.9% regard as threats the destabilizing actions on the Eastern border and 24.3% the continuation of frozen conflicts in the Black Sea Region and the instability in the West Balkans. So, it could be said that a quarter of the respondents consider that threats from the neighborhood need to be explained clearly to the public and addressed in order to foster the development of a string security culture. Only 23% view as threats the distortions on energy markets and competing project of state and non-state actors.

4.7 Security risks to look at. The risk to security represents 'the likelihood that any event, situation, condition with uncertain manifestations could occur and its occurrence could affect in any way the normal functioning of state institutions, the organization and functioning of human communities, as well as the citizens' lives and physical integrity in a given circumstance or determined context,' according to *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy.*

When asked which risks they consider a priority for security culture promotion, the respondents' answers focus on social risks (demographic decline, emigration of active population, environmental degradation, deficiencies in national healthcare, education and welfare systems, as well as distortions on the labor market) together with cross-border organized crime (drug, person, weapon and goods trafficking, illegal migration and economic and financial crimes) which concern respondents' to the greatest extent (63.1% and 61.8% respectively). In their opinion, these should be the focus of security culture promotion. Once more, the focus on national security which impacts human security can be noticed, since these responses can be correlated to the ones regarding the vertical components of security. Social risks take precedence because their effects are commonly felt by the population.

These concerns take precedence over the risks associated with Romania's development failures

(24.3%), regional instability (30.3%), illegal trafficking of conventional weapons (30.9%), as well as high impact low probability risks: low intensity conflicts which persist in time, migratory fluxes generated by natural disasters, pandemics, ecologic disasters (34.2%) and the radicalization of extremist entities (39.5%). The latter's percentage can be correlated with the answers to the previous question regarding threats, more precisely the high percentage of people who perceive terrorism as a threat. The radicalization of extremist entities is considered one of the causes of terrorism. According to *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017*, 'The largest number of attacks in which the terrorist affiliation could be identified were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremists (99). Attacks carried out by left-wing violent extremists have been on the rise since 2014; they reached a total of 27 in 2016, of which most (16) were reported by Italy. The number of jihadist terrorist attacks decreased from 17 in 2015 to 13 in 2016, of which 6 were linked to the so-called Islamic State (IS).

4.8 Security vulnerabilities to observe. A security vulnerability is represented by 'that functional/systemic/structural deficiency that can be exploited or can contribute to the materialization of a threat or risk, determining the weakening of the state's ability to diminish the impact of event with potentially grave consequences for the normal functioning of state institutions, the citizens' lives and physical integrity and the organization of human communities, as well as the capacity to protect, defend and promote values, interests and national security objectives,' according to *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy*.

When asked what vulnerabilities they consider a priority for security culture promotion, the only one indicated by a majority of respondents is corruption (61.8%). This answer confirms the results of an IRES survey carried out in November 2017, according to which 81% of respondents believe that in Romania corruption is unbearable and only 18% disagree.

Scarcity of resources and the incongruence in managing various types of risks that affect interinstitutional reactions in crises situations are indicated by 43.4% of respondents as another vulnerability. The same percentage indicates that workforce migration is a vulnerability that security culture promotion should tackle. 36.8% believe that healthcare is a vulnerability and an almost similar percentage, 36.2%, indicate that the ability

of the central and local administration to implement national and European public policies needs to be addressed. Almost one third of respondents (30.9%) identify poverty as a vulnerability as well as critical infrastructures (28.9%) and energy security (27%). The other vulnerabilities were considered less important as the focus of security culture promotion and only gathered around 20% of respondents' answers: public spending-22.4%, the fragility of civic solidarity-22.4%, economic disparities between regions and counties, demographic decline, social exclusion and polarity-20.4%, and European funds absorption-22.4%.

4.9 Actions to promote security cultures. The actions that need to be undertaken in order to better promote security culture focus not only on changing the behavior of social actors with responsibilities in this field (governmental organizations) but also of those who participate voluntarily (non-governmental organizations) regarding the level of involvement but also the improvement of specific policies and strategies.

When asked which of the following actions they believed could contribute to a more effective security culture promotion, 70.4% of respondents indicated the need to perfect the communication methods and techniques so they ensure that everyone clearly understands security problems. Setting goals and actions to follow for a more efficient promotion of security culture should lead, according to almost two thirds of the respondents (60.5%), to the writing of a national strategy to promote security culture. A better understanding of security issues could be fostered, according to 59.2%, by developing security policies accessible to the general audience. With respect to active participation, it would be more desirable that governmental institutions in the field of security get more involved (42,1%) than non-governmental ones (25,7%). Only 27.6% of respondents believe that a coherent and consistent discourse regarding security coming from qualified institutions and persons could help promote security culture.

These answers confirm the need for strategic communication at the level of the state in order to promote security culture. Strategic communication can reunite all the actions that respondents consider important because strategic communication presupposes clearly-defined objectives, adapted to the target audiences' levels of knowledge and competence so that the objectives of the respective campaigns are met.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Security culture is a complex and dynamic concept and the goal of the present research has been to identify some key components and to estimate and analyze the ways in which security culture is and should be promoted in the Romanian society. Given the fact that the survey results our analysis is based on pertain to a large extent to the under 35 year-old category, we could say that we have a clearer vision of what young people believe security culture is and what aspects of it should be promoted. Security culture is mainly defined by its cognitive and operational approach, and human security is considered to be the most relevant. The risks identified as most prominent pertain to the social domain, the threats refer to cyberattacks and terrorism and the vulnerabilities focus once more on human security aspects. Our conclusion is that strategic communication needs to be employed in order to promote security culture efficiently and extensively and to create an aware and informed audience that can perceive security not solely as a personal or national matter but as an international and collaborative project.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Consiliul European. (2018). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017. *Consiliul European. Consiliul Uniunii Europene* [online]. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/fight-against-terrorism/
2. Government. (2013). Future State 2030: The global megatrends shaping governments. *Mowat Centre* [online]. URL: https://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications/75_future_state_2030.pdf [Accessed April, 2018].
3. Gray, Colin S. (2006). *Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture.* United States Nuclear Strategy Forum. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy.
4. Neagu, Roxana. (2017). Sondaj IRES – Corupție. Rezultate despre lupta anticorupție. *DCNews.* October 31.
5. Smith, Michael. (2017). Most NATO Members in Eastern Europe See It as Protection. *Gallup.* February 10.
6. Snyder, Jack L. (1977). *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*. A project AIR FORCE Report prepared for the United States Air Force. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
7. The President of Romania. (2015). Strategia națională de apărare a țării pentru perioada 2015-2019. O Românie puternică în Europa și în lume. Approved by the common Decision of the Senate and the Deputy Chamber, June 23, 2015. *The Official Gazette,* First Part. No. 450/ June, 23.
8. The President of Romania. (2015). *Ghidul Strategiei naționale de apărare a țării pentru perioada 2015-2019* (GSNAp). Approved by CSAT Decision no.128/ December 10, 2015. Bucharest: Presidential Administration.
9. Zapryanova, Galina & Espinova, Neli. (2017). Most in Eastern Europe Positive About EU Membership. *Gallup.* May 10.
10. ***. (2017). POLIS 2017 Bilanțul anului politic 2017. Perspective pentru 2018. *IRES* [online]. http://www.ires.com.ro/uploads/articole/ires_bilantul-anului-politic-2017_raport-de-cercetare.pdf. [Accessed April, 2018].